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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
THROUGH : Director of Regearch and Reports

Estimates of Communist Marpower Losses in Eouth Vietners

- 1. This memorandum is responsive to a statement by Joseph Alson that intelligence estimates of Communist manpower losses Tail to cover all losses adequately, most particularly those due to disease and sickness.
 - 2. The estimates of manpower losses currently accepted in the intelligence community are those prepared by OFR and used in NIE 14.3-66, "North Vietnamese Military Potential for Fighting in North Vietnem," and in the so-called McNamara II, "The Vietnamese Communists Will to Persist." Our estimated mempower losses use as a base MACV, J-2's estimates of KIA and captured, to which we add estimates of the number of seriously wounded, ralliers and deserters.
- 3. The current estimates of manpover losses do not include estimates of attrition due to disease and sickness. At the time the estimates were prepared we acknowledged that adequate data were not available to make such an estimate. An estimate of such attrition was prepared by ACSI but rejected during the NIE de-losses involved so many unknowns and variables that estimating attrition due to disease and sickness represented an attempt to obtain an untenable specificity. Whatever the emount of ettrition, it was undoubtedly well within the margin of error attributed to the over-all estimate. the over-all estimate.

has uncovered a fair amount of data shedding light on disease and sickness among Communist forces. A very preliminary judgment indicates this attrition might be in the order of 12,000 troops amuelly. If this judgment is confirmed, our estimate of losses would increase by about 10 percent, an increase well within the confidence limits of the original estimates. 4. Since the estimates were prepared, the ORR Task Force tonfidence limits of the original estimates.

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